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The Citizen Lab is an interdisciplinary laboratory based at the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto, Canada focusing on advanced research and development at the intersection of digital media, global security, and human rights.
We are a “hothouse” that combines the disciplines of political science, sociology, computer science, engineering, and graphic design. Our mission is to undertake advanced research and engage in development that monitors, analyses, and impacts the exercise of political power in cyberspace. We undertake this mission through collaborative partnerships with leading edge research centers, organizations, and individuals around the world, and through a pioneering “fusion” methodology that combines technical reconnaissance, field investigations, and data mining, analysis, and visualization.
The Citizen Lab’s ongoing research network includes the Information Warfare Monitor, the OpenNet Initiative, and Opennet.Asia.
The Citizen Lab developed the psiphon censorship circumvention software, and continues to provide “red team” research, threat analysis, and support for open source development for Psiphon Inc through the Psi-Lab project.
این گزارش به کمپین رو به رشد حملات فیشینگ علیه کاربران در گستره ایران و حداقل یک حمله به یک فعال غربی میپردازد. این حملهها تلاش دارند تا امنیت مضاعفی که از طریق رمز عبور دو مرحلهای در گوگل فراهم شده است را دور بزنند و به شکل گستردهای مبتنی بر تماسهای تلفنی و تلاش برای ورود در زمان حقیقی از سوی مهاجم است. جالب اینجاست که این حملهها عموما با یک تماس تلفنی از کشور انگلستان شروع میشده و هکرها به یکی از دو زبان فارسی و یا انگلیسی ارتباط برقرار میکردهاند.
The post تماس از لندن: فیشینگ رمز عبور دو مرحلهای از ایران appeared first on The Citizen Lab.
This report describes an elaborate phishing campaign using two-factor authentication against targets in Iran’s diaspora, and at least one Western activist.
The post London Calling: Two-Factor Authentication Phishing From Iran appeared first on The Citizen Lab.
The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs is hiring a Security Researcher / Malware Analyst to support our work on threats against civil society.
The post Job Posting: Security Researcher / Malware Analyst appeared first on The Citizen Lab.
A "secret network" launched by the Canadian federal government last year, costing millions of dollars to taxpayers, came under close scrutiny following a suspected hack. Citizen Lab Postdoctoral Fellow Christoper Parsons explains the possibilities behind the leaking of the document.
The post Christopher Parsons on the Canadian government’s “secret network” hack appeared first on The Citizen Lab.
This article, written by Postdoctoral Fellow Christopher Parsons and CIPPIC Staff lawyer Tamir Israel, analyzes how successive federal governments of Canada have actively sought to weaken the communications encryption available to Canadians. The article covers regulations imposed on mobile telecommunications providers, state authorities' abilities to compel decryption keys from telecommunications providers writ large, and Canada's signals intelligence agency's deliberate propagation of flawed encryption protocols.
The post Canada’s Quiet History Of Weakening Communications Encryption appeared first on The Citizen Lab.
In this paper presented at USENIX FOCI 2015 we use reverse engineering to provide a view into how keyword censorship operates on four popular social video platforms in China: YY, 9158, Sina Show, and GuaGua. We also find keyword surveillance capabilities on YY. Our findings show inconsistencies in the implementation of censorship and the keyword lists used to trigger censorship events between the platforms we analyzed. We reveal a range of targeted content including criticism of the government and collective action. These results provide evidence that there is no monolithic set of rules that govern how information controls are implemented in China.
The post Every Rose Has Its Thorn: Censorship and Surveillance on Social Video Platforms in China appeared first on The Citizen Lab.